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REVENUE AND TAXATION-COLLECTION OF DELINQUENT
REAL ESTATE TAXES-LEGISLATING PROTECTION OF
THE DELINQUENT PROPERTY OWNER IN AN ERA OF
SUPER-MARKETABLE TAX TITLES
A message from God Almighty. God said yesterday and today to me, "tell that man
that want to take your house-that I God gave you the house and he cannot take it.
Again I am telling you I God gave you the house and the man cannot take it."1
In such words is the solace of their authoress, a seventy-eight year old
Chicago recluse who believes she is a nun, and who has been adjudged by
a court psychiatrist as overtly psychotic and incompetent to manage her
affairs. 2 Yet these words are perhaps the only source of salvation for this
elderly owner of a three-story building, threatened with loss of that building
due to nonpayment of real estate taxes. It is unlikely she could save her
land via redemption, the available legal recourse, since her sole means of
support is a $35.00 per month Social Security allotment.3 Such a situ-
ation is not atypical of the trauma experienced by the aged and infirm
in Illinois, who seised of property which has oftentimes come to them
other than through their own purchase, fail to comprehend the liability
imposed upon them by the levy of state realty taxes. Statutory notices,
whether actually or constructively served, are unheeded; ultimately a fore-
closure results, vesting title in a "tax purchaser" who may have paid a
small fraction of the value of the property in exchange for his now-clear
title and concomitant right of immediate possession. If the premises are
occupied, the tax purchaser, now seised of the real estate in fee simple, has
the option of evicting the unsuspecting tax-delinquent, or, as has been the
occasional practice in Chicago, of giving the occupant the choice of
remaining in possession as a tenant and paying rent or repurchasing the
tax-sold property at market value.4 In one reported case a tax purchaser
of property having a tax delinquency over a period of four years totaling
$640.00, offered the former owner and occupant, a sixty-two year old
recluse with limited comprehension, the option of remaining as a tenant
I. Chicago Daily News, April 24, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. See Chicago Daily News, March 4, 1969, at 3, col. 1; Chicago Sun-
Times, April 23, 1969, at 5, col. 1, at 12, col. 1; Chicago Sun-Times, April 24, 1969,
at 1, col. 1, at 62, col. 1.
LEGISLATION NOTES
at $70.00 per month rent or of repurchasing his former property for
$7,500.5
The aforementioned examples and other similar instances were de-
nounced by Chicago newspapers in a 1969 expos6,6 attacking both the
practices of the particular tax purchaser common to these transactions,
and questioning the justice of the tax sale provisions of the Illinois Rev-
enue Act of 1939.7 Concurrently, bills amending the Illinois Revenue Act
and proposing a change which would greatly mitigate the result of the
above examples, were unsuccessfully promulgated in both houses of the
Illinois General Assembly.8
The "tax sale" provisions of the Illinois Revenue Act have general
counterparts in almost every American jurisdiction.9 Though they repre-
sent only one of many methods in which ad valorem real property taxes
may be collected,' 0 their use is widespread chiefly because they provide
an efficient and speedy means of producing revenue, with relatively little
administrative expense. The tax sale provisions of the Illinois Revenue
Act, the changes proposed in the 1969 Illinois General Assembly, a survey
of comparable legislation in other states, and the prudence of changing
the Illinois real estate tax sale collection system in light of its explicated
purpose are the subjects" considered in an analysis of this aspect of the
Revenue Act. This analysis shall be conducted in light of two competing
interests: the state's desire to collect in an efficient manner all overdue
real estate taxes,' 2 and the interest of an individual in the property he
owns.
13
5. Chicago Daily News, March 4, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
6. See supra note 4.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 482, et seq. (1967).
8. H.B. 2569, 76th Ill. Gen. Assem. (1969); S.B. 1118, 76th III. Gen. Assem.
(1969).
9. The statutes in Delaware, Georgia and Alaska do not contain tax sale pro-
visions as a means of state revenue collection.
10. Other methods include an ordinary action to collect taxes, resulting in an
in personam judgment and levy against the taxpayer, distraint of personal property,
in rem attachment, and the like. See BLACK ON TAX TITLE § 150, at 189 (1893);
Commentary, Iowa Tax System, 23 I.C.A. 73, 86-87 (1965); Harbert, Tax Fore-
closures and Tax Titles, 1952 ILL. L. F. 209, 210.
11. The scope of this paper excludes the procedure for collection of locally-
levied special assessments, a procedure which is frequently parallel to or equivalent
with annual tax collection methods.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 697 (Supp. 1969) implies this purpose. See, e.g.,
People v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 158, 43 N.E.2d 997 (1942); Forman Realty v. Brenza,
11Ill. 2d 531, 144 N.E.2d 623 (1957).
13. See, e.g., MONSEN, MODERN AMERICAN CAPITALISM-IDEOLOGIES AND IssUEs
18-20 (1963); LOCKE, A SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT c.5 (Everyman's
ed. 1924); 5 COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 133 (1964).
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THE ILLINOIS REVENUE ACT
CONSTITUTIONAL SANCTION
The power of the state to levy and collect ad valorem property taxes
originates in article IX of the Illinois Constitution. 14 The state is therein
empowered to sell real estate for the nonpayment of taxes,15 provided
that owners of and other persons interested in such real estate are ac-
corded at least two years in which to redeem the property from sale.16
Also, the law requires reasonable notice of sale to be given such owners
and interested parties.17  In the Illinois constitutional convention con-
vening during 197018 the "Revenue Article"-article IX-is expected to
undergo radical change; change which, it is hoped, will tend to obviate
some of the difficulties of the present Illinois revenue collection system
hereinafter discussed. Nonetheless, the Illinois system as presently extant
has survived a recent challenge under the federal "due process" clause,
wherein plaintiffs alleged that a real estate tax collection system which
divests one of ownership of property while denying him remuneration
of the value of the property less the tax due is a deprivation of property
without due process of law. The three-judge district court in this case,
Balthazar v. Mari, Ltd.,' 9 responded:
The Illinois legislation is constitutional since delinquent landowners, including the
plaintiffs, are adequately notified of their tax deficiencies and of any tax sale or
foreclosure. Unfortunately, the Illinois system severely penalizes all real estate
owners who fail to redeem. The total forfeiture seems extremely harsh when
overdue taxes amount to only two or three per cent of the property's value. But
oppressive statutes must be tempered by the legislation, not the courts. 20
PRE-SALE
Real estate taxes in Illinois are payable in two equal installments per
14. ILL. CONsT. art. 9, § 1 provides: "The general assembly shall provide such
revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by evaluation, so that every person
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of. . . property .... .
15. ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 4.
16. ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 5.
17. Id. Occupants must in all cases be served personally prior to expiration of
the redemption period.
18. Pub. Act 76-40, § 1, Ill. Gen. Assem. 1969 (approved May 7, 1969) pro-
vides: "A Constitutional convention to revise, alter or amend the Constitution of
the State of Illinois is hereby called. The Convention shall convene at the hour of
12 o'clock noon on December 8, 1969. . . 21 This enabling legislation was ap-
proved by a referendum to the citizens of Illinois on November 5, 1968, by a vote
of 2,979,977 to 1,135,440. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ILLINOIS, A BRIEF HIS-
TORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN ILLINOIS (1969).
19. 301 F. Supp. 103, (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal docketed, No. 593, 38 U.S.L.W.
3093 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1969). This case is discussed in detail, infra, at 373-74.
20. Id. at 106.
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annum, 21 which become delinquent respectively on June 1 and Septem-
ber 1 of each year.22  After September 1 of the year in which the tax
becomes delinquent, the county collector publishes a list of tax-delin-
quent real estate in the county; accompanying such list is a notice that the
collector will apply to the court on a specified day for judgment against
the real estate listed, in the amount of taxes and costs and for an order
authorizing him to sell such real estate on a specified subsequent date in
satisfaction of the judgment. 23 During the following October, the county
collector must file with the circuit court all applications for judgment
and orders directing sales. The court must hear and determine all appli-
cations within thirty days of the date prayed for the rendering of judg-
ment.24  This application for judgment is purely an in rem proceeding 25
to enforce the statutory lien of real estate taxes against the res.26 Con-
sequently, no in personam service of process :is required, for the statutory
requirement of publication of the delinquent tax list 27 satisfies all re-
quirements of notice of the application proceeding.28 The court then re-
views the applications for judgment; in so doing it is empowered to hear
any defense to the entry of judgment offered by any interested party, and
to make a summary adjudication as to the validity of the defense.29 How-
ever, no party may enter a defense unless he files with the court proof that
he has paid the disputed tax, albeit under protest.30 In the event the
defense is stricken or no defense is filed, the court then enters judgment
for the taxes found to be due, and directs the issuance of an order of sale,
fixing as the date of sale the date prayed for in the application. 31 During
the time period intervening between the date of judgment and the ordered
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 675 (Supp. 1969).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 705 (Supp. 1969). Note that in counties hav-
ing a population of 500,000 or more, the due dates are May 1 and September 1, id.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 706 (Supp. 1969). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
120, § 709 (1967) for requirements as to the contents of the notice.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 710 (Supp. 1969).
25. First Lien Co. v. Markle, 31 111. 2d 431, 202 N.E.2d 26 (1964); Urban v.
Lois, Inc., 29 Ill. 2d 542, 194 N.E.2d 294 (1963); Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill. 2d 353,
172 N.E.2d 775 (1961); Cherin v. The R. & C. Co., 11 IM. 2d 447, 143 N.E.2d
235 (1957).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 697 (1967) provides as such.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 706 (Supp. 1969).
28. The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly so held: People v. Anderson, 411
Ill. 252, 103 N.E.2d 629 (1952); People v. C. & I. Ry., 386 Ill. 239, 53 N.E.2d 921
(1944); People v. Coal Belt Electric Ry., 311 Il1. 29, 142 N.E. 495 (1924); Smythe
v. People, 219 Il. 76, 76 N.E. 82 (1905).
29. ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 120, § 716 (Supp. 1969).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 716 (Supp. 1969).
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 716 (Supp. 1969). See also ILL REV. STAT. cl.
120, § 718 (Supp. 1969).
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date of sale, the taxpayer or any interested party may pay the taxes
adjudged due, plus costs, and have the property withdrawn from sale.3 2
Thus, a real estate taxpayer whose second installment became delin-
quent on September 1, of a given year might, theoretically, have a judg-
ment for taxes and order of sale entered against the property before the end
of the year, having received no notice, but for the publication of the notice
of application. The first time the taxpayer is required to be served in an
individual capacity with any notice whatsoever is five days in advance of
the sale date. The county collector is required to send a notice by mail
to the known owner, or the most recent taxpayer of record on the property,
at least five days before sale; such notice states the fact that application
was made for judgment and order of sale, the date of sale, and the
specific property to be sold.33
SALE
On the date of sale, the county collector offers each tract of tax-delin-
quent property for bidding;34 the prospective "tax purchasers" do not bid
on the value of the property, however. A tax purchaser pays only the
amount of the delinquent tax judgment plus costs; if there is a redemption
by the property owner, the tax purchaser is entitled to full reimbursement
for the taxes and costs he has paid,3 5 plus a penalty not to exceed the
rate of twenty-four per cent per annum of the amount paid out by the
tax purchaser.3 6 It is this penalty upon which the prospective purchasers
bid; the person who offers to pay the amount due on each tract for the
least percentage penalty is the successful bidder-ergo the tax purchaser.8 7
Thus, prospective purchasers "bid down" the penalty rate, starting at
twenty-four per cent per annum and decreasing theoretically to zero, if
the bidding is competitive. In point of fact, the average sale rate was
approximately thirteen per cent per annum38 in 1969. If there are no
bidders on a given tract, the real estate is "forfeited to the state" rather
than "sold" for taxes.3
9
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 714 (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 715
(Supp. 1969).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 711 (1967).
34. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 724 (1967).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 734 (Supp. 1969).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 734 (Supp. 1969).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 726 (1967).
38. ELROD AND KRAUSE, HOUSE MINORITY REPORT-SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO IN-
VESTIGATE TAX SALES OF REAL ESTATE (Ill. Gen. Assem. June 2, 1969).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 727 (Supp. 1969). The statutory procedure for
forfeited property is somewhat variant. It would not be of any value to elaborate
on forfeiture procedures; hence they are excluded from the scope of this paper.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 753-56 (1967).
[Vol. XIX
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POST SALE AND REDEMPTION
The successful bidder at the tax sale, having paid the delinquent taxes,
is issued a certificate of purchase, which indicates the amount of taxes
paid and the penalty percentage to which the holder is entitled, and
which is fully assignable via endorsement. 40 To preserve his rights, the
tax purchaser must prevent the property from being resold during the
period of redemption; he does so by paying the taxes assessed during the
period.41 Otherwise, a sale of a subsequent year's taxes confers a right
in the subsequent tax purchaser superior to that of the previous pur-
chaser. 42 The "period of redemption" refers to that period of time during
which a person holding a redeemable interest in the land43 may pay the
delinquent taxes plus costs, subsequent years' taxes paid by the tax pur-
chaser, interest, and the penalty bid, and recoup title to the property free
of the encumbrance resulting from delinquent taxes. The period of re-
demption in Illinois is two years from the date of sale, 44 plus as much
of the third year after sale as expires before the tax purchaser takes action
to perfect his tax title.45  Since the tax purchaser may be unprepared to
seek perfection of tax title at the expiration of the redemption period, he
will agree to an extension of the period of redemption and may extend the
redemption period into the third year after sale. 46  If he is not ready to
seek perfection of his tax title and the redemption period is not or may
no longer be extended, he loses the right to perfect his inchoate tax title.47
Of the money paid in by the redemptor, a reimbursement of all that the
tax purchaser has paid out plus his penalty bid is made to the tax pur-
chaser. 48 Thus, a purchaser at a tax sale has a dual incentive: having
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 729 (1967).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969). See generally Harbert, supra
note 10.
43. "As a general rule, any person may redeem land from a tax sale who has an
interest in the land which would be affected by the maturing of the tax title in the
purchaser." BLACK, supra note 10, at 451. This general statement is by no
means easily applied; Illinois courts have long struggled with the question of what
interest is sufficient to entitle the interested party to redeem. See, e.g., County
Treasurer v. First Nat. Bank, 87 Ill. App. 2d 133, 230 N.E.2d 571 (1967); Applica-
tion of County Treasurer, 63 Ill. App. 2d 135, 211 N.E.2d 127 (1965); Weiner v.
Jobst, 22 Ill. 2d 11, 174 N.E.2d 561 (1961). See also Comment, 73 DICK. L. REV.
474 (1969).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 734, (Supp. 1969). Effective 1970, redemption
by cashier's or certified check is allowed, Pub. Act 76-468, Ill. Gen. Assem. 1969
(approved July 18, 1969).
45. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 120, § 734 (Supp. 1969).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 744 (Supp. 1969).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 752 (Supp. 1969).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 734 (Supp. 1969).
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paid the delinquent taxes, and waited two years, he might, in the absence of
redemption, perfect his tax title, thereby receiving good title to property
in exchange for what may be a small fraction of its actual worth; in the
alternative, if redemption is made, the tax purchaser receives as much
as a thirteen to twenty-four per cent per annum return on his investment. 49
PERFECTING TAX TITLE IN THE TAX PURCHASER
As a consequence of the tax sale, the tax purchaser has a statutory
right in the property. This right cannot properly be described as a tax
lien, because the payment of the tax by the tax purchaser extinguishes
the statutory lien 5° of delinquent taxes.51 Nor is the right that of a subro-
gee to the position of the state vis-a-vis the originally assessed taxpayer.5 2
This statutory right is therefore best described as an imperfect, or incho-
ate, tax tide. Assuming no redemption is made during the redemption
period, the tax purchaser then has the opportunity to perfect his inchoate
tax title. He does so by taking the following measures: (1) He must
serve 53 the possessor, the most recent record taxpayer, and all persons
interested of record in the property with a notice that he, the tax pur-
chaser, has paid the delinquent taxes on the subject realty for a given
year, 54 and that he has filed a petition for the issuance of a tax deed. 5
This notice must be served three to five months in advance of expiration of
the extended or unextended redemption period. 56 (2) He may then peti-
tion the circuit court for the issuance of a tax deed, alleging pro forma that
he is the valid tax purchaser or assign, and that no redemption has oc-
curred.5 7 This petition must also be filed three to five months in advance
of expiration of the period of redemption. If the period thereafter expires
and no redemption is made, the court orders the issuance of a tax deed,
provided all tax liability accruing against the property after the date of sale
49. Supra note 38.
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 697 (Supp. 1969).
51. See, e.g., People v. Ogden, 195 Ill. App. 563 (1915).
52. Id.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 744 (Supp. 1969). If the identity of the owner or
most recent record taxpayer can be ascertained, but the property is vacant, service
by registered mail at the last known address is acceptable. If such parties cannot be
ascertained on diligent inquiry, publication alone suffices.
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 744 (Supp. 1969).
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969).
56. Actually, the notice of tax sale and notice of petition filing are separately
required, the first by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 744 (Supp. 1969), the latter by
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969). However, the statute allows com-
bining the notices, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969), and this is the
common practice.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969).
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has been satisfied.58 The court's function is therefore ministerial, but for
the determination of the sufficiency of service of the above notice. "[T]he
court shall insist on strict proof of notice, and, in the event due diligence is
claimed, shall inquire into the facts of diligence . . . ,, 9 The tax deed
is not only prima facie evidence of the propriety of the tax foreclosure
proceedings, but confers title in the grantee free of all claims,60 except
those of parties to easements, covenants running with the land, and public
rights of way. 61 The order directing the issuance of a tax deed is appeal-
able to the state supreme court;6 2 relief after thirty days from the date of
issuance of such order is also allowed under the Illinois Civil Practice Act
provisions for such relief from all final judgments and decrees. 63
Within the three year redemption period, the taxpayer thus receives only
one actual notice, which must be served three to five months prior to the
expiration of the redemption period. This notice is the second of the two
notices which the taxpayer receives pursuant to delinquent taxes on his
real estate, the first notice being the aforesaid notice of application for
judgment and order of sale. Failure to heed this second notice is fatal
to retaining title in the taxpayer, since he is neither party to the appli-
cation for judgment nor to the petition for issuance of a tax deed.
I HOUSE BILL 2569
In April 1969, two bills amending the Revenue Act originated in the Illi-
nois General Assembly, one in each house. 64  The senate bill was sub-
sequently withdrawn 5 in favor of the house bill, H. B. 2569, which pro-
posed the following reforms in the Illinois system:
(1) An additional requirement of notice to the real estate owner as a
prerequisite to the filing of a petition for tax deed. In addition to the
notice of tax sale and filing of petition for tax deed which the tax pur-
chaser must serve three to five months prior to the expiration of the re-
demption period, the county clerk would be required to serve a notice to
occupants, the most recent record taxpayer, and all persons interested of
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969).
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969).
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 751 (Supp. 1969).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747b (Supp. 1969).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969) provides that tax deeds are in-
contestable except by appeal or by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1967). By rule,
cases involving revenue are directly appealable, ILL. SuP. COURT R. 302(a)(1).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1967).
64. Supra note 8.
65. SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 76TH ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY at 1273
(1969).
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record in the subject property, within three months after the date of sale.6
This notice would be of a prescribed form, containing the following
admonition: "IF YOU DO NOT PAY THE AMOUNT DUE FOR TAXES, INTEREST,
AND PENALTIES . . . YOU MAY LOSE THIS PROPERTY FOREVER!" ' 6 7  The
effect of this amendment is twofold: first, it provides an additional
notice, containing a conspicuous, simply-phrased and meaningful warn-
ing to the owner. In contrast, the form of notice of sale and filing of
petition for deed now used would not be as likely to alert the unwary or
uneducated reader. 68 Secondly, it places upon the county clerk, a pre-
sumably disinterested party, the duty of apprising the taxpayer of his
opportunity to redeem. Under the existing system where the tax pur-
chaser is strongly desirous of obtaining the property, his interest militates
against a redemption; an unscrupulous tax purchaser might therefore
exercise much less than diligence in attempting to locate the owner or
owners, in order that he may be allowed to serve such notice by publica-
tion.
If no person is in possession or occupancy of such real estate, or if the person in
whose name the same was last assessed for general taxes, upon diligent inquiry,
cannot be found in the county, or if such owners of or parties interested in such
66. H.B. 2569, § 1, 76th Ill. Gen. Assem. (1969), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
120, § 744 (Supp. 1969).
67. Id.
68. Currently, there is no statutory prescription as to the language which must
be contained in the notice. Therefore, but for the necessary elements of the notice,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 744, 747 (Supp. 1969), any other language is left to the
whim of the tax purchaser, or to the employee of the local legal bulletin who pre-
pares such notice for publication. The following is an example of such a notice:
"NOTICE
TO: [taxpayer] .. .
Take notice that on May 21, 1965, Dennis R. Kelley, pursuant to a Judgment for
Sale entered in January term of the Circuit Court of Cook County for Judgment
for Sale of Real Estate for delinquent taxes for the year 1963 and in conformity
with Section 272 of the Revenue Act of 1939, as amended, purchased the following
described forfeited real estate: [legal description]. That there was included in
said Judgment for Sale for which said real estate was sold, the general taxes for the
year 1963. The purchaser also paid or redeemed, according to law the general taxes
for the year(s) ...
That the time of redemption from said sale, as extended, will expire on March 23,
1969.
You and each of you are further notified that unless redemption is made from sale
within the time allowed by law, the undersigned will on the 25th day of March,
1969, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as his petition may be heard,
appear before his Honor Judge H. G. Comerford, or such other Judge as shall be
sitting in his place and stead, and apply for an order on said petition, directing that
a tax deed conveying said real estate issue to the undersigned and that a writ of
assistance issue to put the undersigned into possession of said real estate. .... "
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, November 20, 1967, at 7. This is hardly likely to alert
anybody other than an attorney.
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real estate, ... upon diligent inquiry, cannot be found in the county, then such
purchaser or his assignee shall publish such notice, as to [such parties] . . ..
Notwithstanding the statutory mandate that the court "shall insist on
strict proof of notice and . . . shall inquire into the facts of diligence,'" 70
an owner who has been fraudulently denied service of the tax purchaser's
notice is at a distinct disadvantage once a tax deed has issued. If the
owner collaterally attacks the order directing the issuance of a tax deed,
he must prove not only that he had not been served with notice, but that
the failure of the tax purchaser to serve him was fraudulent. 71 Therefore,
in practical effect, the tax purchaser need only convince the court hearing
the petition that there has been compliance with the notice requirements;
having so proven, the tax purchaser is protected by the aforesaid re-
quirement that fraud be proven, as well as by the prima facie presumptions
raised by the tax deed itself as to the propriety of the proceedings.7 2 This
protection accorded to the tax purchaser originated in the Illinois legis-
lature's change of policy as to real estate tax deeds in 1951; greater
emphasis was placed on the validity of tax deeds, over the interest of the
original owner, in the hope that tax titles would become more marketable.7 s
The amendment proposed by H.B. 2569 in no way controverts this
purpose. It merely places an additional onus on the county clerk, insuring
that a forgetful but able taxpayer is in fact notified of the tax delinquency.
(2) The method of perfecting inchoate tax title in a tax purchaser
other than a public body, viz. a municipality, the state, or other "taxing
body."74  In lieu of filing a petition for a tax deed, the tax purchaser
would petition the court for a "public tax deed sale"; 75 in the event the
redemption period expires and no redemption is made, the court, after
hearing the petition and determining that all requirements of notice have
been met, directs the county clerk to hold a public sale, rather than to issue
a tax deed. At such sale, any person may bid; the bids at this sale are
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 744 (Supp. 1969).
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969), provides that relief after 30
days be allowed pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1967). See, e.g., Zeve v.
Levy, 37 Ill. 2d 404, 226 N.E.2d 620 (1967); Dahlke v. Hawthorne, Land & Co.,
36 111. 2d 241, 222 N.E.2d 465 (1967); Urban v. Lois, Inc., supra note 25. Note
that prior to 1951, determination of compliance with the conditions precedent to
obtaining tax title was administrative, and correct form was insisted upon; see ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 746 (1949).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 751 (Supp. 1969).
73. Zeve v. Levy, supra note 71. See generally Young, The Tax Deed-Modern
Movement Toward Responsibility, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 181 (1961-62).
74. This would amend ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (Supp. 1969). See H.B.
2569, § 1, 76th Ill. Gen. Assem. (1969).
75. H.B. 2569, § 1, 76th Ill. Gen. Assem. (1969).
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bids of a dollar-price, which the bidder pays in exchange for a deed to
the property. The tax purchaser may bid at this sale, and may take as a
credit against his bid the amount of penalty to which he is entitled. This
credit is the price at which the bidding begins; if the tax purchaser bids
this amount and no other parties bid in at the tax deed sale, then the
procedure is exactly the same as occurs under the existing law. The tax
purchaser would still realize his "windfall," having acquired valid clear
title to the property in exchange only for the payments of delinquent taxes
and costs. However, if other parties bid in at the tax deed sale, the result
is different from that of the present system; if the tax purchaser desires the
property badly enough to bid competitively, and outbids his opponents,
he still gets the advantage of the taxes and costs he has paid out plus the
value of the penalty bid in the form of a credit against his bid at this tax
deed sale. In the event the tax purchaser is outbid at the tax deed sale,
he would receive the same rebate he receives under the law as extant-
the amount of the taxes and costs paid out plus the penalty bid. In any
event, any excess over the amount of taxes, costs and penalty, whether
bid by the tax purchaser or another party at the tax deed sale, would be
rebated to the original owner or owners of the tax delinquent property.
Failure of the tax purchaser to bid at the tax deed sale, in the absence
of any other bidding, or failure of the purchaser to petition the court for a
tax deed sale, would, as today, forever bar the tax purchaser from per-
fecting his inchoate tax title.76 Thus, while leaving unchanged the method
of acquiring inchoate tax title, viz. the "bid-down" system, H.B. 2569
seeks to change only the method of perfecting tax title by making the tax
deed a commodity offered at a public sale, rather than a near-automatic
consequence of a tax purchase, absent redemption. In so doing, H.B.
2569 greatly limits one of the two incentives of the tax purchaser-that
of "windfall" acquisition of the property. The interest incentive re-
mains unchanged, for the tax purchaser is still able to realize the value
of his penalty bid. It has been cogently argued that the "windfall" incentive
should be ameliorated, in light of the gross injustice it causes as weighed
against its allegedly slight attraction value:
The forfeiture [windfall] provision simply does not provide the basic incentive for
speculators to buy tax certificates. The primary incentive is the high interest rates.
Uncontested evidence presented to the Special Committee indicated that in 1967, the
last year for which data is available, most tax delinquent property was redeemed
by the owners. In Cook County [wherein lies Chicago] out of 13,000 tax cer-
tificates sold, all but 130 were redeemed by the homeowners. Thus, in 99% of the
cases, the interest penalty rather than the forfeiture of the realty provided the
investment incentive. 77
76. Id., amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 752 (Supp. 1969).
77. Supra note 38.
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H.B. 2569 was nonetheless rejected by the Illinois General Assembly
after four readings. After three readings, an amendment, and a "do
pass" recommendation by the House Committee on County and Town-
ship Affairs, the bill was passed in the House of Representatives.78 It
was not to survive in the Senate, however; after a first reading, the Senate
Committee on Municipal Corporations accorded a "do not pass" recom-
mendation to the bill, whereupon it was tabled.7 9  Thus, a bill under con-
sideration for over one and one-half months in the House, lived in the
Senate a life of three days.80
COMPARATIVE TAX SALE SYSTEMS
The lien of delinquent real estate taxes on the subject property has no
precedent in the common law; its origin is chiefly statutory.81 Conse-
quently, the development of a specie of tax foreclosure has taken diverse
forms. The distinctions between these forms are, prima facie, mere
procedural niceties; hence, they are and appear to have been in many in-
stances relegated to a summary consideration in state legislatures. How-
ever, these procedural distinctions have, as has been illustrated, serious
substantive ramifications, which ramifications strongly suggest that fu-
ture tax sale proposals receive careful consideration, in light of the com-
peting interests of the state and the taxpayer.
The system so summarily dismissed by the Illinois Senate is currently
effective in almost exact duplicate in Florida,82 and substantially similar
statutes exist to date in three other American jurisdictions.8 3 The present
Illinois system has counterparts in six states.84 Other jurisdictions employ
different systems, some totally diverse and some bearing characteristics
78. Supra note 65.
79. Supra note 65.
80. Supra note 65.
81. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-312 (1956); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE§ 2187 (West 1956); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-1-12 (1967); HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 246-55 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 445.28 (1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.420
(Cum. Supp. 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 552 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 70 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.010 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 77-203 (Cum. Supp. 1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:19 (1955); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 54:5-6 (1960); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX § 902 (McKinney 1960); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 57-02-40 (1960); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5721.10 (Page 1954); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 24304 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 311.213 (1967); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.301 (1949); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-9-1 (1956); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. art. 7320 (1960).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 193.45-194.22 (1957). See Infra notes 86, 90-95.
83. Washington, Kentucky and North Carolina. See infra.notes 87-89.
84. Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, North Dakota, New Jersey and South Da-
kota. See infra notes 111-16.
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common to either or both of the two systems heretofore outlined. In
positing distinguishing characteristics whereby the various tax sale pro-
cedures can be categorized, one need make two determinations: how in-
choate tax title is conferred, and how such inchoate title is perfected.
Distinctions might also be drawn as to the type and number of notices
required to be served upon the owner-taxpayer, as well as to the length
of redemption period; however, for the purpose of this note, the two
former considerations shall constitute the criteria whereby categorical
boundaries are laid. Thus established, the two main categories of tax
sale procedures are as follows: (1) The "two-sale system" which in-
cludes the procedure promulgated in H.B. 2569, whereby inchoate tax
title is acquired by a purchaser at preliminary "tax" or "tax lien" sale,
and perfected tax title is acquired through a second sale, a "tax deed"
sale, held after the expiration of the redemption period. Universally, the
second sale is a public sale to the highest bidder for cash. However,
divergencies in the tax lien sale result in certain sub-categories to be later
enumerated. (2) The "one-sale system" has four subclassifications: (a)
the "Illinois bid-down" sale, wherein the one sale confers inchoate tax
title in the party who agrees to pay taxes and costs and to receive the
lowest rate of interest as a return, the tax title being perfected semi-
automatically in the tax purchaser absent redemption; (b) the "pub-
lic auction sale," wherein the highest bidder for cash receives inchoate
tax title and an exclusive right to perfection thereof, absent redemp-
tion; (c) the "tax-sale-no-bid-down," wherein inchoate title and ex-
clusive right to perfection are conveyed to the person who will pay the
taxes and costs due on the land in exchange for the smallest divided or,
in some states, undivided, interest thereof;8 5 and (d) the "automatic sale
to the state," whereby taxes which remain delinquent on a given date
are automatically "sold" to the state (i.e., the state foregoes receipt of
its taxes until the expiration of the redemption period, whereafter it may
sell the land at public sale to defer tax expenses, or otherwise dispose of or
use the property as it sees fit).
THE TWO-SALE SYSTEM
Those states employing the two-sale tax system are Florida, 6 Wash-
ington, 7 Kentucky88 and North Carolina. 9 In Florida, as in H.B. 2569,
85. "[Here the term 'highest bidder' means the one who will pay the tax for
the least quantity of land." BLACK ON TAX TITLES § 262, at 326 (1893).
86. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 193.50, et seq. (1957).
87. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.64.010, et seq. (1962).
88. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 134.420, 134.440, et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1966).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-387 (a), et seq. (1965).
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inchoate tax title is conferred via a bid-down tax sale:
The land shall be struck off to the person who will pay the tax, interest, costs and
charges and will demand the lowest rate of interest for the first year, not in excess
of the maximum rate allowed by law.90
Because the interest rate bid only applies to the first year for which taxes
are delinquent, and interest then compounds at eight per cent per annum
for subsequent years prior to redemption, 9' the amount required for re-
demption does not become as prohibitive as does the amount to redeem
in Illinois. If there has been no redemption after two years from the
date of sale, the tax purchaser files an application for a tax deed sale
with the court clerkYa2 The clerk is then required to publish a notifica-
tion of sale, 93 and to serve the taxpayer with a similar notifica-
tion. 94  Thus, as in H.B. 2569, the burden of notifying the delinquent
taxpayer of his last chance to avert loss of his property falls to a public
official, not to the tax purchaser. The tax deed sale is at public auction, to
the highest bidder for cash; 5 the tax purchaser is credited for the amount
paid out plus the interest at the rate bid for the first year, and at eight per
cent for subsequent years, pursuant to the tax sale.96  Any surplus bid
at the tax deed sale is held for the benefit of the now-former owner. 97
Washington, Kentucky and North Carolina do not employ the bid-down
sale of inchoate tax title; all utilize a sale of the tax lien for cash.98 Only
North Carolina provides that the tax lien sale must be public, with com-
petitive bidding among prospective tax purchasers. 99 Any excess over
the amount of delinquent taxes due is payable immediately to the property
owner.'0 0 However, after the public tax lien sale is held, no provision is
made for redemption by the property owner. Therefore, his right to re-
demption is presumably cut off by the tax lien sale. After six months
from the date of sale, and prior to the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions for such action, the tax purchaser perfects his title by bringing an ac-
tion to foreclose his tax lien, an action in the nature of a mortgage fore-
closure.' 0 1 A decree of foreclosure includes an order of sale at public
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.56 (1957).
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.02 (1) (1957).
92. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.15 (1957).
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.16 (1957).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.18 (1957).
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.21 (1957).
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.21 (1957).
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.22 (1957).
98. KY. REV. STAT. § 134.450 (Cum. Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
387(d) (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.64.010 (1962).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-387 (e) (1965).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-387 (e) (1965).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-391 (1965).
auction. 10 2 As in a mortgage foreclosure, the tax purchaser must account
to the former owner for any excess over the amount of his lien, viz. his
cash bid at the tax deed sale plus interest; however, the tax purchaser
may also bid in at the sale and credit the amount of his lien to his bid.'0 3
Thus, whereas the taxpayer has virtually no redemption rights in North
Carolina, the tax purchaser has no interest incentive to induce him to pay
the taxes. Kentucky and Washington provide that the tax lien sale shall
be only for the amount of taxes due plus costs.' 0 4 If there is more than
one prospective purchaser, Kentucky applies the rule of "first-come, first-
served,"' 0 5 while the Washington statute stands mute on the point. After
expiration of the redemption period'06 the tax purchaser commences
an action to foreclose a tax lien, 107 culminating in a public sale to the
highest bidder for cash, any excess bid over the taxes due being re-
fundable to the taxpayer. How efficiently the "first-come, first-served"
rule operates in practical effect is conjectural, as is the procedure followed
in Washington when there are many prospective tax purchasers. 08 Note
that in both systems the interest incentive is ignored.
If Florida's experience with its two-sale practice is at all instructive,
it constitutes a glowing endorsement of the system. Referring to the
Florida tax sale law, one author has noted:
This statute was designed to create a marketable title to lands against which tax
proceedings were [previously] necessary because of nonpayment of taxes . . . . At
this point we need only state that the law has been well received by the people of this
state; that it is fair and just to the delinquent taxpayer; and that it has eliminated
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-391 (1965).
103. See generally C.J.S. Mortgages § 792, at 1518 (1949).
104. Ky. REV. STAT. § 134.440 (Cum. Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 84.64.010 (1962).
105. Ky. REV. STAT. § 134.450 (1962).
106. The period is three years in Washington and Kentucky. Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 134.480, 134.490 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.64.030, 84.64.070
(1962).
107. Ky. REV. STAT. § 134.490 (Cum. Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 84.64.080 (Supp. 1969).
108. It appears that the Washington statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 84.64.010 (1962), which provides for sale of the tax lien via a certificate of de-
linquency, really operates as a one-sale system: "[Dliscussion with various tax
collecting officials indicates that the law providing for sales of certificates of de-
linquency to individuals is regarded as a 'dead letter.' Such certificates are rarely
sold. In a study of tax delinquency of rural real estate in seven Washington coun-
ties, it was discovered that during five years, 1928-32, such tax liens were sold on
less than 10 per cent of the delinquent acreage. In the years since 1933 it appears
that almost no certificates have been sold to individuals." Eldridge, Property Tax
Collection Procedure in Washington, 17 WASH. L. REV. 123, 135 (1942). One
might expect a more frequent use of the tax lien sale to have produced amendatory
clarification of the statute.
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a backlog of delinquent taxes, thereby producing an appreciation in the value of all
lands subject to taxation. 109
Yet the same author has cautioned that a "tender consideration for the
delinquent taxpayer," causing a modification of the Florida system would
be "a distinctly backward step that will not be for the economic good of the
citizen." 110  Thus, the Florida system, as does H.B. 2569, appears to
strike a balance of interests: the delinquent taxpayer, though still subject
to a summary divestment of title, is accorded the right to the proceeds from
a sale of his land at public auction upon his failure to redeem; the state
still may entice tax purchasers with the lure of an inflated return on their
investments upon redemption or sale to another bidder, as well as the still
existent possibility of a windfall acquisition of the property absent com-
peting bidders.
THE ONE-SALE SYSTEM
The majority of states convey tax title via a single sale. This sale is a
sale of the tax lien rather than perfected title; perfection is generally a
ministerial, semi-automatic procedure, although there are exceptions. Ari-
zona,"' Colorado, 112 Minnesota,"11 North Dakota, 1 4 New Jersey 1 and
South Dakota"16 utilize a form most closely similar to that of Illinois, all
utilizing the common characteristic of a single sale conferring unperfected
tax title upon the party who agrees to pay the delinquency at the lowest
rate of percentage return on the moneys paid." 7 Arizona and North Da-
kota have more extensive provisions for a priori notice to the tax-
payer than does Illinois; the Arizona statute provides that the taxpayer
shall first be mailed a notice of delinquent taxes,"18 while both Arizona
and North Dakota provide for a mailing of notice of proposed sale"19
in advance of publication of the delinquent tax list.' 20 In New Jersey 121
109. Thompson, Tax Titles in Florida, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1953) (empha-
sis added). See also Bowen, Florida Tax Deed Titles, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 497 (1953).
110. Thompson, supra note 109.
111. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-381, et seq. (1956).
112. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-9-1, et seq. (1967).
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 279.02, et seq. (1969).
114. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-24-01, et seq. (1960).
115. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 54:5-6, et seq. (1960).
116. S.D. COMP. LAws §§ 10-23-2, et seq. (1967).
117. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-393 (1956); COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-9-
15 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 280.02 (1969); N.J. REV. STAT. § 54:5-32 (1960);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-24-12 (1960); S.D. CoMP. LAws § 10-23-8 (1967); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 726 (1967).
118. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 42-385 (1956).
119. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-387 (1956); N.D. CENT CODE § 57-24-01
(1960).
120. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-388 (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-24-02,
57-24-07 (1960).
1969]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
and Colorado, 2 2 notice of tax sale requirements are similar to those of
Illinois, while South Dakota and Minnesota pay the least deference to the
tax delinquent, making no provision for mailed notice of the tax sale. In
these states, publication of the delinquent tax list is conclusive as notice
upon the taxpayer for all purposes. 123  Of the seven states utilizing the
Illinois bid-down system, Colorado, New Jersey, North Dakota and South
Dakota provide for perfunctory perfection of title;124 Illinois, Arizona
and Minnesota require, at least ostensibly, that proof sufficient to satisfy
a court or adjudicative administrative body be adduced that the taxpayer
was duly notified of the expiration of the redemption period. 125
The second form of single sale system to be discussed is that which is
in use by a plurality of American jurisdictions. Twenty-one states 126
and the District of Columbia127 enforce the lien of real estate taxes via
a "public sale," viz. single sale of inchoate tax title and the exclusive
right to perfection thereof at public auction to the highest bidder for cash.
Certain jurisdictions provide expressly that any surplus realized at such
sale over the amount of tax indebtedness shall be held for the benefit of
the tax-delinquent.12 8  Others impliedly incorporate this provision by de-
fining the tax lien sale as one in the nature of a mortgage foreclosure, 29
121. N.J. REV. STAT. § 54:5-25 (1960).
122. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-9-1, 137-9-2 (1967).
123. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 279.09 (1969); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 10-23-2 (1967).
124. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-9-28 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 54:5-80
(1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-27-02 (1960); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 10-25-11
(1967).
125. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. H8 42-451, 42-455 (1956); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 747 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 280.27 (1969).
126. ALA. CODE tit. 51, §§ 262, et seq. (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-157,
et seq. (1960); HAWAII REV. STAT. H8 246-56, et seq. (1969); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 64-2259, et seq. (Supp. 1969); LA, REV. STAT. ANN. H§ 47:2182, 47:2183, et seq.
(1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 943, et seq. (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art.
81, §8 80, et seq. (Supp. 1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, §§ 43, et seq. (1958); Miss.
CODE ANN. tit. 39, §§ 9923, et seq. (Supp. 1966); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. 84-4124
(1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:24a (Supp. 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 80.24 (1955); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX §§ 1006, et seq. (McKinney 1960); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5721.18, 5721.19, et seq. (Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§§ 5860.605, et seq. (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 44-9-8, et seq. (1956); S.C.
CODE..ANN. §§ 65-2766, et seq. (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2012, et seq.
(1955); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 7328, et seq. (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§§ 5255, et seq. (1959); VA. CODE ANN. 88 58-1030, 58-1033, et seq. (1950);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11A-3-4, et seq. (1966).
127. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1001, et seq. (1968).
128. IND. ANN. STAT., § 64-2261 (Supp. 1969); ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 275
(1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1003 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 39, § 9934
(Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2766 (1962); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT, art. 7328
(1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § I1A-3-37 (Supp. 1969).
129. HAWAI REV. LAWS § 246-56 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 943
(1964); OHlo REV. CODE ANN. § 5721.18 (Page 1954).
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a characteristic of which is that the foreclosing mortgagee must account
to the debtor for any surplus received over the amount of indebtedness.' 30
Pennsylvania and Tennessee explicitly make provision as to how the funds
paid in at sale are to be allocated within the public office, but do not ac-
count for the situation wherein the proceeds of sale exceed taxes and
costs. 13' It could well be the case that this problem has never arisen.
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Montana, New York, New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, Maryland, Vermont and Virginia codes are mute on the
point1 32 In Louisiana, prior to 1954, the tax-delinquent was entitled to
the proceeds of sale after taxes, costs and collateral tax obligations of the
taxpayer had been liquidated by the proceeds of the tax lien sale; 33 how-
ever, in 1954 the legislature, in changing the priority of disposition of the
proceeds of the tax sale, deleted the provision according surplus proceeds
to the taxpayer.' 34
The states which fail to provide disposition of surplus proceeds to the
owner would seem to embrace the worst of all possible worlds; neither the
owner nor the state is fully benefited. The state is denied the important
interest incentive which is obtained in the bid-down sale, and the owner is
deprived of his property as summarily as he is in the Illinois bid-down
system. Indeed, the owner is accorded even worse treatment than in the
Illinois system; not only is the owner denied an opportunity to remunera-
tion in part compensation for loss of his land, but the state, by distributing
surpluses into the general fund, realizes the value of the property in excess
of the lien. Although the state's failure to provide an interest incentive
may be mitigated by the ability to receive a more lucrative return from the
sale of tax-delinquent property, disbursement into a general fund does not
aid the state in retiring tax-delinquent property from its rolls and placing
such property back into the stream of commerce where it can be gain-
fully used and improved. The constitutionality of a tax sale statute
which denies the owner the right to surplus proceeds bears not only on the
validity of the statutes in the states referred to above, but also affects the
Illinois bid-down system. One anomaly among the states in this category
is notable. The tax sale in Texas confers perfected tax title in the
130. Supra note 103.
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5941.4 (1949); see County Comm'rs v. Pro-
thonotary, 14 D. & C. 2d 89 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2012 (1955).
132. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-157 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 80:24 (1955); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-4124 (1947); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 60, § 43 (1958); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 80 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAX. § 1006 (McKinney 1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-9-8 (1956); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 4254, 5255 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1030 (1950).
133. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2190 (1952).
134, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2190 (Supp. 1969).
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highest bidder.185 No redemption from this sale is permitted, so long as a
private party is the tax purchaser.136 Consequently, the procedure pre-
requisite to a judicial order of sale is more rigorous. Although char-
acterized as an in rem proceeding,187 the application for tax sale must
occasion service of process upon all record owners and persons otherwise
interested of record, as in ordinary foreclosure suits.1 38 Although this
requirement is not jurisdictional, it may serve the interests of the tax-
delinquent owner to a greater degree than does the opportunity to redeem
from sale, especially when the owner is not made aware of this "opportun-
ity" until shortly before its expiration.
The third specie of single sale system is characteristically defined in
the most cryptic of statutory language. This method of sale, adopted in
seven states,' 39 is a sale of inchoate tax title to the person offering to pay
the taxes and costs in exchange for title to the smallest portion of tax-
delinquent real estate, i.e., a "tax sale without bid-down." The pro-
spective tax purchasers ostensibly bid down the fraction of the interest of
ownership, divided in some instances140 and undivided in others' 4' which
they will accept as consideration for their payment of delinquent taxes and
costs. At first perusal, this system appears most cumbersome; rather than
operating to re-insert the property in toto into the stream of commerce,
the system replaces the delinquent tax encumbrance with yet a heavier
burden, viz. the de facto encumbrance of a plethora of de minimis title-
holders, seised of divided or undivided shares, each of which is diminished
in value with every successive tax sale. Presumptively, this does not
operate in the state's interest; nor does it provide any special enticement
to tax purchasers. In view of these ramifications, and of the more attrac-
tive alternatives to this system of tax sale, one is tempted to ask whether
this system is really carried into execution as prescribed. Certain indica-
135. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. art. 7328, 7328a (1960).
136. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 7339 (1960).
137. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 7326 (1960); Trimble v. Farmer, 296 S.W.2d
580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 156 Tex. 533, 305 S.W.2d 157
(1957).
138. TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. art. 7328, 7328.1 (1960).
139. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1105 (Supp. 1967); IOWA CODE ANN. § 446.16
(1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.115 (1960); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.190 (1967);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1807 (Cum. Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. AN. § 74:40 (1957);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 39-127 (1957).
140. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 74:40 (1956); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-127 (1957; see
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.190 (1967), which appears to connote a divided interest sale.
141. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1105 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1807
(Cum. Supp. 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.115 (1960); see IOWA CODE ANN. §
446.16 (1969), construed in Brundige v. Maloney, 52 Iowa 218, 2 N.W. 1110 (1879);
Op. Ia. Atty. Gen. 1938, at 10.
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tions that this is not actually the current practice are present in two
states. Missouri law, although providing for sale of the tax lien to the
person who will pay the taxes in exchange for the smallest portion of the
tax-delinquent property, 142 also contains a provision that surpluses re-
ceived at the tax sale shall be held by the county collector, subject to the
claim of the delinquent owner.'14  Presumably, there is no surplusage if the
prospective purchasers bid down the quantity of ownership they are willing
to accept in exchange for payment of taxes and costs; only a single
liquidated sum is paid in. This inconsistency implies that if no person
is willing to accept a fractional interest, it is the practice of Missouri to
convey the tax lien via a public sale to the highest bidder for cash.
Michigan explicitly embraces a hybrid system, combining the tax sale
without bid-down with a public sale for cash as the alternative:
Each parcel described in the decree shall be separately exposed to sale . and the
sale shall be made to the person paying the full amount charged against such
parcel, and accepting a conveyance of the smallest undivided fee simple interest
therein .... If no person will pay the serveral taxes and charges and take a
conveyance of less than the entire thereof, then the whole parcel shall be offered and
sold.1 44
With the unlikelihood that many speculators will bid in on sales of frac-
tional interests in conventionally subdivided property, the effect of the
tax sale without bid-down seems nugatory, the actual sale being either
public, as is indicated above, or a forefeiture to the state. Yet, lest state
legislatures be unjustly faulted for maintaining antiquity in their laws,
one state, Wisconsin, appears to adhere strictly to the tax sale, no-bid-
down principle. Wisconsin not only contains a provision for such a sale,145
but further provides guidelines whereby division of the property shall be
made pursuant to the tax sale.' 46 In those states where the tax sale with-
out bid-down system has become a fiction due to the inability to procure
bidders on fractional interests, the method by which the property is
disposed of is likely either a public sale to the highest bidder for cash, or
an automatic sale to the state; in either event, it behooves legislators in
these states to redraft the tax sale legislation.
The final form of single-sale system currently in use in American juris-
dictions places the greatest burden on the state. Inchoate tax title is
automatically sold to the state, or an extension thereof, by operation of
law. The state therefore foregoes its right to payment of taxes until ex-
142. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.190 (1967).
143. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.230 (1967).
144. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.115 (1960).
145. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 74:40 (1957).
146. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 74:40 (1957).
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piration of the redemption period and functions as the custodian of the
rights of the owner, in that the state must render the requisite proof and
notices to the owner. Eight western states are presently utilizing this
system.147 In California, there is first a sale to the state of all delinquent
taxes by operation of law. 148 After five years, absent redemption, the
property is deeded to the state 149 upon giving of notice to the owner. 150
The deed to the state vests the following rights in the state: the right to
lease out the property, subject to the right of redemption which must be
included as a condition subsequent to the lease agreement;' 5' the right to
retain title to the property in the state and foreclose the right of the
owner to redeem via an action to quiet title,' 52 in which the owner,
occupants and parties interested of record must be served with process,
53
and in which a default decree is prohibited; 54 and the right to sell the
tax-deeded property via public auction, 155 or privately on application of a
prospective purchaser, 150 the sale operating to terminate the owner's right
to redemption.' 5' When proceeds are realized from the lease or sale of
tax-deeded property, the California statute provides for allocation of the
proceeds between the state and its various political subdivisions.'1 8  No
provision is made, however, for surplusage distribution to the owner.
Nonetheless, the taxpayer's rights are given the best possible a priori pro-
tection in the California system, while the state bears the burden of a five
year delay in collection of its delinquent taxes. California is characteristic
of seven of the eight western states utilizing the automatic forfeiture sys-
tem. The only anomaly exists under Nevada law, whereby, after sale of
inchoate tax title to the state by operation of law, the state may, before
147. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3436 (West Supp. 1968-69); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 63-1114 (1948); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2306 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
ch. 371, § 361.570 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. 72-8-5 (1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 68, § 24313 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 312.100 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 59-10-33 (1963).
148. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3436 (West Supp. 1968-69). The sale is held
21-35 days after publication of the delinquent tax list, CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3351
(West 1956).
149. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3511 (West 1956).
150. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 3354, 3355, 3358 (West 1956).
151. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 3651, 3653, 3656 (West 1956). A criticism
might be made that this would discourage lessees, and could be improved by a re-
quirement in lieu of a termination clause in the lease, that the tenant-lessee attorn
to the redemptor.
152. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3594, 3605, 3614.5 (West 1956).
153. CAL. REV. & TA CODE § 3597 (West 1956).
154. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3603 (West 1956).
155. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3693 (West 1956).
156. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3696 (West 1956).
157. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 3707 (West 1956).
158. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 3718-3724 (West 1956).
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the expiration of the redemption period, sell such title to a private pur-
chaser at private sale. 159 In Nevada, therefore, the sale to the state could
function as a guide for a practice of private sales of tax title.
The automatic forfeiture system still utilized by the states referred to
above seems to be the antithesis of the other tax sale systems. Significant
is the fact that the states using this system of tax collection are located
exclusively to the west, where the presumption was at one time that land
was still sufficiently available for development, such that realty tax col-
lection systems could still accord maximum protection to delinquent own-
ers. Thus, the following statement of legislative policy is still viable:
It is hereby declared that it is the intention of this act to provide a method whereby
persons who have lost title to property through sale of the same to the state for
delinquent taxes may repurchase such property and recover the title thereto without
undue hardship and whereby the state and its subdivisions may receive their proper
revenue; and to the accomplishment of these intentions [this] act is to be liberally
construed. 1 6 0
Contrast this statement with the explicated statutory policy of the other
categories of tax sales, favoring marketability of tax title and thus di-
minishing the rights of the property owner:
In view of the paramount necessity of providing regular tax income for the State,
county and municipal governments, particularly for school purposes; and in view of
the fact that tax delinquency, aside from being a burden on the taxpayers of the
State, seriously impairs the rendering of these essential services; and in view of the
further fact that delinquent land, with its attendant problems made acute by
the events of the past decade, not only constitutes a public liability, but also repre-
sents a failure on the part of delinquent private owners to bear a fair share of the
costs of government; now, therefore, the legislature declares that its purpose in
the enactment of the following article . . . is threefold: First, to provide for the
speedy and expeditious enforcement of the tax claims of the State . . . ; second, to
provide for the transfer of delinquent lands to those more responsive to, or better
able to bear, the duties of citizenship . . . ; and third, in furtherance of the policy
favoring the security of land titles, to establish an efficient procedure that will quickly
and finally dispose of all claims of the delinquent former owner and secure to the
new owner the full benefit of his purchase. 1 61
Such a massive apologia suggests that the state commits tax delinquent
owners to punishment by breaking upon the wheel, rather than by selling
their property. 162
159. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 24316 (1966).
160. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-8-44 (1961).
161. W. VA. CODE ANN. § IIA-3-1 (1966).
162. Breaking upon the wheel is defined as a method of execution "by which
the Criminals run through ten thousand of the most exquisite Agonies, as there are
Moments in the several hours and days during the unconceivable Torture of their
bruised, broken, and disjointed Limbs ....... 1 RADzNowicz, A HIsTORY OF
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 237 (1948).
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CONCLUSION-HOW SHALL THE DELINQUENT TAXPAYER BE PROTECTED?
The era of a priori protection of the taxpayer at the cost of the state
is apparently waning. The automatic forfeiture states can be expected
to follow the same evolutionary paths as did their counterparts, with the
inevitable increase in population and urbanization causing the state to lose
its ability to bear the burden of foregoing its realization of realty revenue
for periods of one to five years. Traditional protections of the taxpayer
have not adequately served his interests, or preserved any of the states'
interests. This is true because the remedy contemplated by these pro-
tections is the nullification of the tax sale. 163 But nullification does not
liquidate the tax lien; thus the state is unsatisfied because its revenue
remains uncollected and the taxpayer is in no better position if he cannot
pay the taxes, because the land simply must be resold, giving rise to fur-
ther administrative expense.
A cogent tax collection system should be predicated upon two assump-
tions: (1) Certain persons, such as our self-deified recluse, can no
longer, due to some form of incapacity, bear the liability of taxes, and
should therefore be exempt; and (2) where taxes are delinquent, sold,
and unredeemed by those people who remain accountable therefor, the
tax-delinquent owner or owners should lose their property without re-
course. Using this second proposition as a working assumption, legislators
should not seek to avoid a tax sale for irregularity but should: (a) Impose
upon public officials-not private tax purchasers-the rigorous duty of
keeping the taxpayer well informed of his delinquency and its consequent
occurrences, sanctioned not by the nugatory threat of nullification of the
sale, but rather by specific statutory prescription of procedures which must
be followed, as well as accountability to the tax-delinquent owner for
official misconduct; and (b) provide a method whereby the delinquent
taxpayer in the event of all tax sales has an opportunity to realize the net
of the fair market value of his property minus the lien of taxes, penalty
and costs, as proceeds of the tax lien or tax deed sale. The Florida sys-
tem emulates these ideals to the greatest extent as has been thus far demon-
strated. By providing a bid-down tax lien sale, it preserves to the tax
purchaser the interest incentive of which the Illinois legislature is so
zealously protective. By providing a subsequent public sale to the high-
est bidder, it preserves the interest of the taxpayer-owner to the extent of
the value of his land in excess of the lien, as was originally the objective
of the single public sale. Moreover, it allows the tax purchaser to realize
the lucrative interest rate either as a credit on his bid at the public sale,
163. See generally annots. 97 A.L.R. 842 (1934); 147 A.L.R. 1141 (1943); 104
A.L.R. 823 (1936); 84 A.L.R. 324 (1932); 4 A.L.R.2d 575 (1948).
[Vol. XIX
LEGISLATION NOTES
or as cash proceeds, if the tax purchaser does not wish to bid com-
petitively. Certainly, the Florida system appears as the most ingenious
and progressive tax sale system utilized to date. That a state legislature
considering tax reform should pay strict heed to the provisions of the
Florida system is obvious. However, whether a state can be made to
embrace the above assumptions is also a viable issue, as well as is the
question of the extent to which jurisdictions have already moved toward
protection of the delinquent taxpayer.
The first assumption-i.e., the exclusion of disabled persons from tax
liability-has found its way into realty tax collection laws to only a limited
extent. At least one-fourth of American jurisdictions provide that a party
under a legal disability at the time of the tax sale may redeem at any
time within one to two years after the cessation of the disabling condi-
tion. 6 4  This is not the best of provisions; the taxpayer receives a de mini-
mis advantage, one of which he is not likely to avail himself. Moreover,
the use of legal capacity as a criterion excludes the poor, old age pension-
ers, and those of marginally subnormal intelligence, from the protected
class. Nor is the state's interest served; the marketability of tax title is
threatened by the contingency of redemption at any time. Two states
have promulgated other alternatives. Prior to 1951, a disabled taxpayer
in Illinois could redeem from tax sale at any time before the expiration
of one year following the cessation of disability;6 5 that provision was re-
pealed in 1951,166 with no alternative consent to the disabled being
enacted until the 1969 session of the Illinois General Assembly. At that
session, the legislature gingerly moved to protect the rights of the dis-
abled taxpayers. As a result, effective 1970, if a person sixty-five years
of age or over owns tax-delinquent real estate either by himself or jointly
with his spouse, and resides therein with his spouse, such person, upon
proper application is entitled to a $1,500 reduction in his property assess-
ment valuation. 167  This represents to a slight degree the attitude dictated
by the first presumption, i.e., to provide in personam relief to the disabled
delinquent taxpayer, and to let him keep his land, rather than sell a nol-
marketable interest in the land.168 Connecticut has embraced this principle
164. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1201 (Supp. 1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1003
(1968); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-422 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 447.7 (1969);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 281.04 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.350 (1967); NEB. REV.
STAT. 99 77-1826, 77-1827 (Cum. Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-26-04
(1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 24318 (1966); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 10-24-3
(1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1047 (1950); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-132 (1957).
165. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 734 (1949).
166. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 734 (1951).
167. Pub. Act 76-1868, Ill. Gen. Assem 1969 (approved Oct. 10, 1969).
168. The relief is minimal, but the attitude it reflects may be important for
the future.
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to an even lesser extent:
When any person committed to jail by the collector for the nonpayment of any tax
is poor and unable to pay it, he may apply to take the poor debtor's oath . . . and,
if he is admitted to take such oath, the community shall pay such collector the . . .
tax.16 9
A more liberal policy toward consents to the indigent and disabled would
cause the state to forego sale on comparatively few parcels; yet the
benefit to the taxpayer, by comparison, is enormous.
The second assumption above, viz. that if the land is to be sold, let it be
sold without recourse, and the two sub-assumptions thereunder have found
slight recognition. Only one-third of the American jurisdictions impose the
duty of notice-serving upon a public official, rather than or in addition to
the adversely interested tax purchaser. 70 Acceptance of the second sub-
assumption has been the subject of controversy; should or must the states
accord to the delinquent taxpayer-owner an opportunity to receive surplus
funds produced by a tax deed sale? Is a tax-delinquent owner entitled
to the opportunity to receive the surplus proceeds of a public sale of the
property for cash? This question has been totally denied consideration
in the courts, save in the aforementioned Balthazar case.
The question of entitlement to surplus proceeds has only arisen in state
courts where the tax purchaser was a public body, pursuant either to
forfeiture or bidding-in by such public body. The courts have been
unanimous in holding that where the tax purchaser is a public body, and
said tax purchaser has perfected its inchoate title, any resale by the tax
purchaser of its perfected tax title vests no right to proceeds in the delin-
quent owner."" These cases miss the point; the question raised in these
169. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-160 (1960).
170. This includes the automatic sale-to-the-state jurisdictions, where the tax
purchaser is a public body, see supra note 147. Other states so providing include
those requiring that perfection may only be sought in a quasi in rem foreclosure
action, whereby the owner must be served with process by a public official, the
sheriff: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2228 (1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81 § 100
(Supp. 1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, § 65 (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-387
(d) (1965). Others merely provide, as does H.B. 2569, that the public official must
serve a notice of expiration of the redemption period: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-456 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.16 (1957); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-
9-28 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2280 (Supp. 1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.119
(2) (1960); N.Y. REAL PRop. TAX § 1014 (McKinney 1960); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 57-27-02 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-3-23 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 84.64.030 (1962).
171. Kelly v. City, 348 Mass. 385, 104 N.E.2d 123 (1965); Spurgias v. Morris-
sette, 109 N.H. 275, 249 A.2d 685 (1969); Peace v. Fraley, 192 Okla. 119, 134
P.2d 344 (1943); Longview Co. v. County, 1 Wash. 2d 64, 95 P.2d 376 (1939);
Costerwyck v. County, 31 Wis. 2d 513, 143 N.W.2d 497 (1966), cert. denied 385
U.S. 981, reh. denied 385 U.S. 1021; Dancy v. Davidson, 183 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.
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cases is whether a public tax purchaser has any lesser rights than a private
tax purchaser, once inchoate tax title is perfected. In all these cases,
the proceeds were not produced until after tax title was perfected. But
the true question involves entitlement to proceeds produced before or upon
perfection of tax title, i.e., at a tax lien sale (inchoate) or a tax deed sale
(perfected). Such a question naturally goes to the validity of the statute,
whereas the cases here referred to presume such validity.
The contention that a system is unconstitutional if it does not provide
the owner with the opportunity to receive surplus proceeds before or upon
perfection, has been raised to date only in Balthazar.
The Balthazars claim that when their property was sold at a tax sale, they were
deprived of due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs assert that tax delinquent real property cannot be sold by the state to a
private purchaser at a tax sale unless there is a provision for unrestricted public
bidding based on the real estate's value .... 172
Plaintiffs' insistence on a public sale of the real property for cash is predi-
cated on the premise that such a sale gives the owner an opportunity to
recover the value of his property even though he cannot redeem, so
long as there is competitive bidding. Thus, plaintiff contended:
[The] Court has consistently upheld the power to confiscate property to pay delin-
quent taxes but only where there is an opportunity for the delinquent debtor to re-
cover the value of his property that exceeds the debt, even if it becomes too late for
him to redeem the property itself ....
Under Illinois law there is no means whatsoever for a delinquent owner who
cannot redeem to obtain the surplus value of his property .... 173
The United States District Court denied this contention, holding that the
owner is accorded due process of law by virtue of his right to redeem,
even though he has no opportunity to realize surplus proceeds from sale.
The touchstone of the court's rationale was Nelson v. New York,174
wherein the United States Supreme Court refused to invalidate a tax
lien foreclosure procedure in which the state had retained the surplus
proceeds of a public sale. Balthazar is currently pending before the Su-
preme Court;175 the appellants' basic contention is that Nelson is inapposite
because that court took cognizance of the delinquent owner's right to
intercede in the foreclosure proceeding, to assert that his property has a
Civ. App. 1944); Booty v. State, 149 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); County
Comm'rs v. Prothonotary, supra note 131.
172. Balthazar v. Mari, Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 103, 105, (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal
docketed, No. 593, 38 U.S.L.W. 3093 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1969) (emphasis supplied),
contained in Jurisdictional Statement of plaintiff, at 4a.
173. Id. at 4a-5a.
174. 352 U.S. 103 (1956).
175. Supra note 172.
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value substantially in excess of the lien, and to obtain the surplus pro-
ceeds of the sale.' 76
But we do not have here a statute which absolutely precludes an owner from ob-
taining the proceeds of a judicial sale. In New York v. Chapman Docks Co....
an owner filed a timely answer in a foreclosure proceeding, asserting his property
had a value . . . exceeding the tax due. The Appellate Division construed . . . the
statute to mean that upon proof of this allegation a separate sale should be directed
so that the owner might receive the surplus. What the City of New York has done
is to foreclose real property . . . and, in absence of timely action to redeem or
to recover any surplus, retain . . . the entire proceeds of its sale. We hold that
nothing in the Federal Constitution prevents this where the record shows adequate
steps were taken to notify the owners .... 177
This excerpt of the Nelson decision strongly indicates that the Court did
take cognizance of the owner's right to intercede, and of the New York v.
Chapman Docks Co. ;178 appellants' contention in Balthazar would thus ap-
pear to have merit.
But distinguishing Nelson from Balthazar is not dispositive of the prob-
lem; it does not resolve whether the denial of surplus proceeds is a depriva-
tion of due process. Although the Court has in the past reviewed and vali-
dated state tax sale statutes which deny surplus proceeds to the owner, 79
it has only squarely faced the question of the validity of a statute which
denies the right to surplus proceeds, in light of the fifth amendment, on
two occasions. In United States v. Taylor,5 0 the Court reviewed a sale
of real property to collect a direct tax levied by the United States upon
its citizens, apportioned among the states and territories."" The prop-
erty had been sold to a private purchaser for $3,000, to liquidate a tax
lien in the amount of $70.50,582 and the former owner sued in the Court
of Claims to recover the excess. The Court found, as a matter of statutory
construction, that plaintiff was entitled to the surplus.
We find nothing in the provisions of the Act of 1862 . . . which takes from the
owner of the land the right accorded him by the Act of 1861, of applying for and
receiving from the Treasury the surplus proceeds of the sale, nor anything incon-
sistent with that right ....
The Statute . . . was an Act for the collection of taxes in insurrectionary districts.
It was not a confiscation act . .. .188
Taylor, because couched in terms of statutory construction, sets no real
176. Supra note 173, at 6.
177. Nelson v. New York, supra note 174, at 110 (emphasis supplied).
178. 1 App. Div. 2d 895, 149 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1956).
179. See, e.g., Kentucky Union v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140 (1911); King v. Mul-
lins, 171 U.S. 404 (1898); Slater v. Maxwell, 73 U.S. 268 (1867).
180. 104 U.S. 216 (1881).
181. Act of August 5, 1861, 12 Stat. 292.
182. United States v. Taylor, supra note 180, at 217.
183. Supra note 180, at 219-20.
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constitutional precedent. However, in United States v. Lawton,184 the
Court moved closer to a constitutional consideration. In Lawton,
realty was sold by the United States under the same act involved in
Taylor. The amount of the lien was approximately $170, and the United
States, bidding in at the sale, became the successful tax purchaser for the
sum of $1,100.186 The plaintiff, a remainderman, applied to the Treasury
Department for surplus proceeds of the tax sale.
The present case differs from the Taylor Case only in this, that the land was in this
case bought in by the tax commissioners for the United States and no money was
paid on the sale . . . . The land in the present case having been struck off for and
bid in for the United States at the sum of $1,100, we are of opinion that the surplus
of that sum, beyond the $170.50 tax, penalty, interest and costs, must be regarded
as being in the Treasury of the United States, under the provisions of . . . the Act
of 1861, for the use of the owner, in like manner as if it were . . . received . . .
from a third person .... 186
It would appear that, as in Taylor, Lawton was a matter strictly of
statutory construction, not of constitutionality, but for the further assertion
of the Court:
It can make no difference that the United States acquired the property by bid-
ding . . . To withhold the surplus from the owner, would be to violate the 5th
Amendment to the Constitution, and to deprive him of his property without due
process of law or to take his property for public use without just compensation. 18 7
Although the "just compensation" assertion is questionable, 188 this opinion
is the closest the Court has ever come to considering a delinquent owner's
right to surplus proceeds under the fifth amendment.
With these great conflicts to be resolved, the Court should, in 1970,
re-examine Nelson, Lawton, and Taylor. If the fifth amendment has
truly been incorporated within the fourteenth as applicable to the states,1 89
184. 110 U.S. 146 (1884).
185. Id. at 148, 149.
186. Id. at 149. Note that this presents an issue specifically concerning future-
interest holders. The due process ramifications of tax sales as to these parties is
contained in Comment, 73 DIcK. L. REV. 474 (1969).
187. Id. at 150.
188. See supra note 19.
189. Nelson v. New York, supra note 174, at 110.
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then Lawton should be overruled, Balthazar reversed, and the Illinois
bid-down system invalidated.190
Howard C. Emmerman
190. The fifth amendment "due process" clause was applied to the states in a
non-criminal context in that body of cases which promulgated the "substantive due
process" doctrine, whereby the due process clause was used as a hatchet to excise
state legislation, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); New York State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). However, the substantive due process
approach was never applied to ad valorem property tax statutes. These statutes
have been appraised under the interstate commerce clause, e.g., Nashville V. &
St L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337
U.'. 562 (1949), but as applied to real estate, this approach is irrelevant. The
closest factual analogy to a challenge to a state ad valorem real property tax chal-
lenge are those cases wherein the "petty larceny of police power" is exposed: the
cases applying the proscription against taking without just compensation, e.g., Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Chicago, B. & 0. R.R. v. Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). It has been argued, supra note 19, that a tax levy is
not taking for a public use. This argument requires stringent analysis, in view of
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); United States v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946);
City v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
